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Introduction: to construct Nord Stream or not?
The arguments concerning Nord Stream vary greatly between the EU 
member states, existing transit countries (Belarus and Ukraine), Russia, and the 
countries not directly involved in the pipeline (particularly Norway, Central Asian 
states and countries involved in the plans related to South Stream and Nabucco). 
There are no commonly accepted arguments either in favour or against Nord 
Stream. 
Despite such an embedded ground, one can name at least the following 
arguments which have been presented in favour of the pipeline. To begin with, the 
EU's gas consumption is estimated to grow in the future, and therefore, it seems 
logical to import more gas from Russia, which possesses a quarter of the world's 
1 Kari Liuhto holds a professorship in International Business and he is Director of the Pan-European 
Institute.   His   research   interests   include   EU-Russia   economic   relations,   energy   relations   in 
particular, foreign investments into Russia, and the investments of Russian firms abroad. Liuhto has 
been involved in several Russia-related projects funded by both Finnish institutions and foreign 
ones, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the United Nations, and the 
World Bank.
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Abstract
The present article aims to emphasize the reasons that led to the conclusion 
that European Union needs a common energy policy, in order to face the challenges of 
the present. In the first part of the article is being debated the problem of building the 
Nord Stream pipeline. Also, the first part of the article is developing 3 of the main 
reasons that make the common energy policy a necessity within European states. 
The second part of the article emphasizes another two strong reasons and 
also draws a conclusion regarding the same stringent necessity. natural gas reserves. Following this line of thought, should the natural gas volumes 
from Russia to the EU grow, new pipelines need to be constructed, since the 
existing pipelines are not enough for all planned gas and liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) is not a serious option, at least for time being
2. In addition, the reliability of 
the transit countries, particularly Belarus and Ukraine, has been questioned, 
implying  that pipelines bypassing transit countries would be a more secure 
alternative for gas shipments  than pipelines going through ex-Soviet transit 
countries. Thirdly, it has been suggested that the direct pipelines from Russia to the 
EU integrate Russia towards the EU, since they strengthen the interdependence 
between the parties. Fourthly, it has been claimed that undersea pipelines are less 
easy to be sabotaged than those built on the ground, referring especially to those 
pipelines which are planned to go through the Caucasus or the Middle East. 
Correspondingly, the following arguments have been used against the 
pipeline. The direct pipes do not support European integration since they neglect 
the interest of the countries-in-between. It has been said that the direct pipelines 
divide the EU, as the large EU countries involved would neglect the Union as a 
foreign policy actor and start to strengthen their bilateral relations with Russia. In 
fact, Nord Stream has even been compared to the gas version of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop   Pact   or   another   iron   curtain   (Watson,   2008;   Argus,   2009b). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the undersea pipelines would be more 
expensive to be erected than ground pipelines
3. In addition, it has been stated that 
the corrosion of the pipeline on the bottom of the sea would be faster and its 
possible   repair   would   be   more   difficult   to   handle   than   on   the   ground. 
Environmental issues have also been presented against the pipeline, implying that 
the construction of the pipeline would release toxic waste, and dislodge underwater 
explosives and chemical weapons dropped to the bottom of the sea after WWII. 
Military issues have also appeared in the arguments against the pipeline, indicating 
that the Russian Navy would become more active in the region
4, thus disrupting the 
military balance of the Baltic Sea region. It has also been argued that the pipeline 
and its maintenance would facilitate espionage. Last but not least, some experts 
2  In mid-February 2009, Russia opened its first LNG plant in Sakhalin (IHT, 2009a). When the plant 
reaches its full capacity in 2030, it will chill and ship around 5 % of the world's LNG supply i.e. 90 
million tonnes of LNG. Now, the installed capacity is some 10 million tonnes (EIU, 2009). 
According to IEA (2008b), Russia's LNG capacity is expected to remain rather insignificant, i.e. 
just 13 bcm in 2015. In this context, one should not neglect the plans of Siemens to become 
Gazprom's strategic partners in LNG sphere, particularly in the Shtokman field (Itar-Tass, 2009a).  
3  "Considering the length of Nord Stream (roughly 750 miles) and the difficulties of the Black Sea 
(most of South Stream would lie in water more than 1 mile deep), these projects, if completed, 
would be among the most expensive pieces of petroleum transport infrastructure in the world. But 
Gazprom is not interested in these projects because they are sound, cost-effective investments (they 
clearly are not), but because of the political leverage the lines would create. Pipelines that bypass 
existing transit states such as Poland and Belarus would allow Russia to supply core Europe 
directly, granting Russia the ability to turn off supplies to individual states - most notably Germany 
and Ukraine - without endangering supplies to other states." (Stratfor, 2007).
4  Österlund (2009) aptly writes that "the frequency of sailing of Russian Navy surface vessels and 
certainly also submarines will increase in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Finland in connection 
with the protection of the pipeline."
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myth, which would not hold if the EU-Russia relations start to cool down.   
Almost any criteria presented, either in favour or against the pipeline, can 
be challenged, and hence, one should not evaluate the situation by looking through 
a pipe but should have a broader perspective on the issue. In order to find an 
answer whether or not to construct Nord Stream, this article tries to develop the 
EU's external supply security with five interconnected actions: (1) save energy = 
= improve energy efficiency; (2) increase own energy production = decrease 
import dependency; (3) diversify external energy sources = lower dependency on 
any external gas supplier; (4) store and share = prepare for non-delivery; and 
(5) develop sustainable relations with the largest external energy supplier = create a 
reliable partnership with Russia. In the following the aforementioned issues will be 
discussed in greater detail.
Save energy = improve energy efficiency
Without decisive pro-nuclear energy measures the EU's own energy 
production declines, which means that we are forced to import more energy (to 
become more dependent on external sources), unless we are able to reduce our own 
energy consumption. Energy saving does not necessarily result in lower economic 
wellbeing, if we are able to rationalise our energy consumption. The majority of 
the EU member states are able to reduce their energy consumption with relatively 
reasonable investments. I believe that the best return on energy savings investment 
can be achieved in Eastern and Southern Europe and changing the energy 
consumption patterns of households everywhere in the EU.
The EU would require an executable energy saving programme in order 
not to become overwhelmingly dependent on imported energy. The programme 
should not only be based on increasing the awareness of EU citizens (i.e. 
Intelligent Energy - Europe Programme), but on substantial rewards and sanctions 
for households and enterprises. However, before that is possible the EU needs a 
common energy policy.
The EU's net energy imports have grown significantly since the year 1990 
and now stand at 51 % of total primary energy supply. The EU's net import share is 
clearly higher than in the OECD in general (31 %). If the current trend continues, 
the EU's import dependency jumps by 2030. Therefore, one may ask, is it safe to 
build the future of 500 million EU citizens on an external energy supply (IEA, 
2008a)
5.
Even if the EU aims at saving energy, the current trend suggests that the 
Union's energy consumption increases by more than 10 % during the period  
2005-2030 (Table 1). Though the consequences of the international financial crisis 
reduce the growth pressures in the medium-term, in the longer run the EU cannot 
escape from the vicious circle of external dependency, unless it starts a serious 
5  I believe that the Russian Government would not accept that Russia would be as highly dependent 
on external energy supplies as the EU is.
Review of International Comparative Management                      Volume 10, Issue 2, May  2009energy saving programme and starts to invest more in its own energy production.
The total energy consumption of the EU, 1990-2030
Table 1
Source: IEA, 2008a
Increase own energy production = decrease import dependency
While the EU's energy consumption is predicted to increase by clearly over 
10 % by 2030, the Union's energy production will decrease by approximately 20 % 
during the same period (IEA, 2008a). Even if energy production with wind, solar, 
and combustible renewables is to multiply, the aforementioned energy sources 
cannot compensate for the production fall of the four energy pillars of the EU i.e. 
the drop of nuclear energy by 12 %, coal by 36 %, gas by 55 %, and oil by 69 % 
during the following two decades. In this context, one should keep in mind that the 
aforementioned four energy pillars account for some 85 % of the EU's current 
energy production and over 90 % of our primary energy consumption (Appendix 1 
and 2).
Since the EU does not have significant hydrocarbon resources and we are 
forced to reduce the consumption of coal to meet the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, 
we have only one domestic pillar left, i.e. nuclear power. I argue that the EU 
should increase nuclear energy production significantly, if it does not want to 
become too dependent on imported energy. The energy supply security of the EU 
can be achieved only when nuclear power would cover more than natural gas in the 
EU's primary energy consumption. Currently, nuclear power accounts for some 
14 % of the Union's primary energy consumption, whereas natural gas is 25 %. The 
current trend does not promise too bright a future for the next generation, who will 
be forced to become an international energy beggar, unless we start to take serious 
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The number of nuclear power stations should multiply, if the EU does not 
want to be led by external energy providers
6. This means that the energy policy of 
the EU's large member states should become more favourable towards nuclear 
energy. At the moment, the share of nuclear energy in primary energy consumption 
is 39% in France, 10 % in Germany, 0 % in Italy, and 7 % in the United Kingdom. 
It seems that unless the aforementioned countries make their energy consumption 
more dependent on nuclear power than on natural gas i.e. the share of gas in the 
primary energy consumption is 15 % in France, 24 % in Germany, 39 % in Italy, 
and 38 % in the United Kingdom.  As only the United Kingdom has any 
independent gas production worth mentioning among the aforementioned group of 
countries, it is obvious that a relatively insignificant role of nuclear energy in the 
German energy policy and the total absence in the Italian policy increases the EU's 
dependency on imported gas (Appendix 1 and 8).
Although the United Kingdom is a significant producer of natural gas 
within the EU, one should not be lulled by an illusion that it has significant natural 
gas reserves. The proven natural gas reserves will last only about six years at the 
current production rate. As the EU possesses only a couple of percent of the 
world's natural gas reserves while consuming a fifth of the global natural gas 
production, it is clear that building our energy policy on natural gas means giving 
our future into foreign hands.
To conclude, one should not forget that the EU's own natural gas 
production will inevitably drop significantly in the following two decades. Today, 
the EU is able to cover 43 % of our natural gas consumption. In 2030, the share is 
just 16 %. The situation with oil is much worse (Appendix 3).
Diversify external energy sources = lower dependency 
on any external gas supplier
Nowadays, Russia covers 24 % of the Union's natural gas consumption, 
being clearly the most important external gas source. Russia's share is equivalent to 
the combined stake of two next largest external gas suppliers, namely Norway and 
Algeria. Should the EU member states build their future on natural gas, it seems 
evident that the role of Russia in the Union's gas supply will increase, since 
Russia's gas reserves are by far the largest on the earth, around a quarter. It is wise 
to keep in mind that Russia's gas reserves are comparable to two next largest 
reserve holders, Iran and Qatar, together (Appendix 3, 4, 5, and 8).
Higher gas consumption in Europe means more gas transport to Europe i.e. 
6  Although the EU would erect a significant number of new nuclear power stations, it cannot totally 
avoid any external dependency, since the Union is almost completely dependent on imported 
uranium. The EU can produce only 2 % of the uranium it consumes. Four countries, namely Canada 
(24 %), Russia (19 %), Niger (16 %), and Australia (14 %), take care of nearly three quarters of the 
EU's uranium supply (IEA, 2008a). On the other hand, their uranium import dependency is less 
risky than hydrocarbon dependency since the EU can store the uranium to meet its needs for several 
years, whereas the storage capacity for oil and natural gas is rather insignificant.   
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is about 310 bcm. In addition to the pipelines, the EU has 14 LNG terminals in 
operation or under construction with a total capacity of around 115 bcm. Only 
small additions in LNG capacity, apart from those already under construction or 
approved, are expected in the EU27 by 2015, when the capacity is expected to be 
around 120 bcm
7. All in all, gross import capacity is thus above 420 bcm, with 
most of the unused capacity on the lines from Russia (IEA, 2008a). 
Russian and Norwegian gas is imported through pipelines into central 
Europe, and into the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries, respectively. 
LNG imports account for only about 13 % of the EU's gas imports, with the major 
suppliers being Algeria, Libya, Qatar, and Nigeria. Naturally, one way to deliver 
the gas is to combine the pipeline and LNG transportation, for instance, by 
transporting gas from the Barents Sea / the Yamal Peninsula into the Russian 
harbour on the Gulf of Finland, and thereafter, ship it in LNG form to the West 
(Argus, 2008b). The price might increase, but this alternative would save the Baltic 
Sea as toxic substances would not be released from the sea bed. On the other hand, 
LNG shipments would increase the maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland
8, and 
hence, increase the possibility of a LNG tanker collision with an oil tanker, a 
possibility which has skyrocketed during this decade (Liuhto, 2003).   
When analysing the necessity of new pipelines, it needs to be remembered 
that the gas pipelines going through Belarus and Ukraine are not used to their full 
capacity. Secondly, one should not forget that the Blue Stream pipeline with a 
capacity of 16 bcm distributes only around 10 bcm from Russia to Turkey (Argus, 
2009i). Building Nabucco with a capacity of 30 bcm and using the full capacity of 
the pipelines going through Belarus and Ukraine
9, one could easily forget the 
building of South Stream with a planned capacity of 31-47 bcm (Appendix 6 
7 Centre for European Policy Studies (2009, 6) estimates a much bigger role for LNG. “In 2020, 
30% of gas supply may be in the form of LNG.” Such a share seems highly optimistic since that 
would mean that the annual LNG shipments should exceed 200 bcm.  
8 It has been calculated that shipping 55 bcm of natural gas would require 650 LNG tanker 
shipments annually i.e. 1300 voyages back and forth the Gulf of Finland (Österlund, 2009).  
9 It is interesting to note that Belarus has recently indicated its readiness to increase gas transit 
capacity from Russia to the EU (Trend, 2009). Also Ukraine has informed about its readiness to 
modernise and extent its pipeline network with the help of the EU (IHT, 2009b). "The European 
Union has pledged to help upgrade Ukraine's network of natural gas pipelines in exchange for a 
stake in the country's energy management. The European Union has long said it would help 
Ukraine modernize its 40-year-old grid of natural gas pipelines - a network that is approximately 
a decade past its life expectancy. … If Europe buys a seat not just at that table but any 
negotiations when the word 'energy' is involved, the dynamics change, and the Russian tool will be 
weakened. Brussels would be a part of the negotiations in which the crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine is created. This will also enable the Europeans to counter (or at least be aware of) any 
growing rift well before it happens. Europe would be able to step into the actual negotiations for 
the first time, instead of sitting on the sidelines watching their lights go out. But such a scheme is 
riddled with problems." (Stratfor, 2009b). Ukraine has suggested expanding the annual pipeline 
capacity by 60 bcm. The current operational capacity is 120 bcm (Argus, 2009e; Joint Declaration, 
2009). 
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10. 
Although Nabucco does not solve the diversification problem of the EU
11 
and it is everything but an easy project, it is an absolute necessity for the Union in 
its attempts to diversify its energy sources. If the EU fails in its diversification 
plans, and correspondingly, if Russia manages to build direct gas pipes and a more 
organised form of co-operation between the main gas producers
12, this would mean 
an end to attempts to create a common energy policy for the EU
13.    
Nabucco's main problems are linked with four issues: (1) where to find 
enough gas to fill the pipeline; (2) how to convince all the necessary parties needed 
(gas producers in Central Asia and the Middle East, transit countries, organisations 
financing and building the pipe, and consumers in the EU); (3) how to secure the 
pipeline from terrorist attacks; and (4) how to ensure that Turkey does not to use its 
strengthening role as a strategic transit hub to press the Union to accept its 
membership before both the parties are ready for deeper integration (Socor, 
2009)
14.  
Gas from Azerbaijan does not suffice to fill Nabucco, as Azerbaijan's gas 
Correspondingly, the European Commission stresses with the words of Commissioner Ferrero-
Waldner (2009) that "the provisions of the joint declaration will help Ukraine integrate its gas 
sector into the EU's internal energy market. I hope they will also clear the way for some of you 
here today to invest in Ukraine's infrastructure. The Commission will play is part by providing 
Ukraine with the technical assistance it has requested to support its commitments."   Not 
surprisingly, "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the plan 'unprofessional' and threatened to 
review ties if the EU continued to ignore Russian concerns … 'If this is a small technical 
breakdown in complex, three-way relations between Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union, 
then it's nothing', said Putin. 'But if it's the start of attempts to ignore the interests of the Russian 
Federation, then of course it's bad" (Reuters, 2009). RIA Novosti (2009a) writes: "If the EU 
Ukraine and Russia negotiate the problem and sign a trilateral gas treaty, this will greatly change 
the EU's energy policy." "The harsh tone of Russia's reaction, and especially the content of the 
official statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, clearly demonstrate that Russia does 
not recognise Ukraine as a fully sovereign state with a right to shape freely its co-operation with 
external partners" (EW, 2009a, 4).
10 Nabucco and South Stream projects are rivals and it is evident that both the pipelines cannot be 
served with gas. It seems that that the question is not only about the gas but also the future of 
Central Asia. Russia seems to be very unwilling to let any Western countries balance Russia's 
political   dominance   in   the   region   (Norling,   2007).   Russia   aims   at   torpedoing   the   EU's 
diversification attempts by buying gas supplies of other gas producing countries, such as the gas 
supply of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Nigeria (Blank, 2009; MT, 2009b). 
11 The EU's total gas imports are close to 380 bcm, while the Nabucco's planned capacity is some 30 
bcm (Arinc, 2007) i.e. less than 10 % of the EU's total gas imports (Appendix 11).  
12Russia, Iran and Qatar possess together over 50 % of the global gas reserves (Appendix 8).
13  "Member States are not obliged to adopt a foreign policy towards energy-producing countries 
common to all members of the European Union" (Haghighi 2008, 165).
14  Watson (2009) writes "prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told reporters during a visit to 
Brussels in January that his government might pull its support for Nabucco if the EU blocks 
discussions on the energy chapter of the country's stalled membership bid for the bloc, 'If we are 
faced with a situation where the energy chapter is blocked, we would of course review our 
position [on Nabucco],' Erdogan said, referring to reports that Cyprus is blocking the opening of 
Turkey's energy chapter negotiations over a dispute with Turkey over oil and gas exploration in 
the Mediterranean Sea." 
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a large part of this gas (Argus, 2009h). Therefore, Nabucco needs gas from Central 
Asia and/or the Middle East
15. In order to gain access to these resources, the Trans-
Caspian Pipeline and/or new pipes in Iran should be erected. In this context, one 
should not forget that the pipeline between Northern Iran and Turkey operates far 
below full capacity
16 and does not link with the main producing fields in Southern 
Iran. Moreover, one should keep in mind that though Iran has the second largest 
energy reserves in the world, but it nevertheless is a net importer of natural gas 
(Norling, 2008). In addition, Iran needs to build working political relations with the 
USA and the EU before the Union can realistically rely on the Iranian energy 
supply
17. Current and potential instability in the Caucasus region and the Middle 
East emphasise a need to find a sustainable political solution, since without the 
political solution there will not be reliable pipelines in the region (Yakobashvili, 
2008). 
Nord Stream, if it will come alive, is a colossal distribution channel as its 
planned capacity may reach 55 bcm. In order to fill Nord Stream in full, Russia 
should open new giant gas fields beneath the Barents Sea (the Shtokman field) and/
or in the Yamal Peninsula (the Bovanenkovskoe field)
18. The opening of these new 
fields is not problem-free either technically or financially. In this context, one 
should not forget that the exploitation of the Arctic Ocean reserves requires special 
technology and the transportation of the required material to the Yamal Peninsula 
is a challenging task, since due to global warming the permafrost in the Russian 
North is melting, and hence, the road network in the Russian North is even less 
reliable than the Russian road system in general. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that the opening of the Shtokman field is not economically viable if the price of an 
oil barrel is below USD 50-60
19. The price of the Russian Urals blend has 
fluctuated between USD 40-50 in the first quarter of 2009 (Argus, 2008d). 
"The final investment decision on the Shtokman project has been delayed until next 
15 Still only 1 % of Europe's gas imports originate in the Middle East and the South Caspian Sea 
(Norling, 2008).
16 "The 20 bcm Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline operates far below full capacity and is currently only 
delivering around 7 bcm per year" (Norling, 2008, 133).
17 Baev (2009, 8) correctly states that "Iran's gas fields, in particular the giant South Pars, are far 
more accessible than the offshore Shtokman field in the Barents Sea or remote Bovanenkovskoe 
field in the permanently frozen Yamal Peninsula. … If Iranian gas starts getting pumped into new 
pipelines, the whole picture of global gas balance would change, and Europe stands to benefit 
from that. … This perspective, however, remains blocked by a huge obstacle: Iran's nuclear 
program." 
18 Gas production in the Bovanenkovskoe field may reach up to 115-140 bcm per annum, but on the 
other hand, the investment needs are considerable. Just an example, close to 2500 km of new 
pipes should be constructed before the gas can travel to the West (Solanko & Ollus, 2008). In 
other words, the new pipeline needed is longer than the distance from Berlin to Istanbul (2320 
km) or from Brussels to Lisbon (2100 km). 
19 Troika Dialog (2009b) writes in mid-March as follows: "Deputy Prime Minister [Russia] Igor 
Sechin has said that offshore development should not be a priority in the short term, because 
capital investments required are not justifiable in the current pricing environment".
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field is still on track to enter production in 2013. But SDC [Shtokman Development 
Company] chief executive Yuri Komarov warned last year that development could 
be delayed by a prolonged period of lower crude prices" (Argus, 2009c, 1).
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Primary energy consumption of selected countries in 2007
Oil Natural gas Coal Nuclear Hydro
USA 40 % 25 % 24 % 8 %   2 %
Azerbaijan 36 % 60 %   0 %   0 %   4 %
Finland 39 % 13 % 17 % 20 % 12 %
France 36 % 15 %   5 % 39 %   6 %
Germany 36 % 24 % 28 % 10 %   2 %
Italy 46 % 39 % 10 %   0 %   5 %
Kazakhstan 18 % 30 % 50 %   0 %   3 %
Norway 22 %   8 %   1 %   0 % 68 %
Poland 26 % 13 % 60 %   0 %   1 %
Russia 18 % 57 % 14 %   5 %   6 %
Turkmenistan 19 % 81 %   0 %   0 %   0 %
Ukraine 11 % 43 % 29 % 15 %   2 %
United Kingdom 36 % 38 % 18 %   7 %   1 %
Iran 42 % 55 %   1 %   0 %   2 %
Qatar 18 % 82 %   0 %   0 %   0 %
Algeria 34 % 63 %   2 %   0 %   0 %
Egypt 48 % 46 %   1 %   0 %   5 %
China 20 %   3 % 70 %   1 %   6 %
Japan 44 % 16 % 24 % 12 %   4 %
EU27 (2005) 37 % 25 % 18 % 14 %       7 % *
* The share includes all renewable energy sources.
Sources: BP, 2008; European Environment Agency, 2008
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The EU's energy production until 2030
Source: IEA, 2008a
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The origin of the EU's gas and oil consumption
Source: IEA, 2008a
Appendix 4
The sources of the EU member states' gas consumption
Source: Loskot-Strachota & Pelczynska-Nalecz, 2008
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EU member states' gas imports and Russia's share
Source: Russian Analytical Digest 34, 2008
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The eastern gas pipelines towards the EU
Sources: Loskot-Strachota & Pelczynska-Nalecz, 2008; Russian Analytical Digest 41, 
2008
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The EU's gas supply via transit countries
 
Gas transported via Ukraine (billion cubic meters)
Supply potential of the via Turkey




Iran 10 bcm Turkey 20-30 bcm 3-10 bcm
Turkmenistan 13 bcm Iran/Turkey 30 bcm 13 bcm
Turkmenistan 16 bcm Aze.Geo/Turkey 30 bcm None
Saudi Arabia 10-20 bcm Jordan/Syria/Turkey 20 bcm None
Azerbaijan 8 bcm Turkey 20 bcm 8 bcm
Iraq 10 bcm Turkey 10 bcm None
Egypt 4 bcm Jordan/Syria 10 bcm Link to Syria
Sources: Özdemir, 2008; Bekker, 2009; Russian Analytical Digest 53, 2009
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Global gas reserves and production
Reserves (R)       Production (P)        R/P ratio
North America   4.5 % 26.6 % 10.3
USA   3.4 % 18.8 % 10.9
Canada   0.9 %   6.2 %   8.9
Mexico      0.2 %   1.6 %   8.0
S. & Central America   4.4 %   5.1 % 51.2
Europe & Eurasia33.5 % 36.5 % 55.2
Azerbaijan   0.7 %   0.3 %       Over 100
Denmark   0.1 %   0.3 % 12.6
Germany   0.1 %   0.5 %   9.6
Italy   0.1 %   0.3 % 10.0
Kazakhstan   1.1 %   0.9 % 69.8
Netherlands   0.7 %   2.2 % 19.4
Norway   1.7 %   3.0 % 33.0
Poland   0.1 %   0.1 % 26.4
Romania   0.4 %   0.4 % 54.4
Russia 25.2 % 20.6 % 73.5
Turkmenistan   1.5 %   2.3 % 39.6
Ukraine    0.6 %   0.6 % 54.0
United Kingdom   0.2 %   2.5 %   5.7
Uzbekistan   1.0 %   2.0 % 29.8
Others   0.2 %   0.4 % 39.4
Middle East 41.3 % 12.1 %      Over 100
Bahrain Less than 0.05%   0.4 %   7.4
Iran 15.7 %   3.8 %      Over 100
Iraq   1.8 %   n.d.      Over 100
Kuwait   1.0 %   0.4 %      Over 100
Oman   0.4 %   0.8 % 28.6
Qatar 14.4 %   2.0 %      Over 100
Saudi Arabia   4.0 %   2.6 % 94.4
Syria   0.2 %   0.2 % 54.7
United Arab Emirates   3.4 %   1.7 %      Over 100
Yemen   0.3 %   n.d.      Over 100
Others Less than 0.05%   0.2 % 18.5
Africa   8.2 %   6.5 % 76.6
Algeria   2.5 %   2.8 % 54.4
Egypt   1.2 %   1.6 % 44.3
Libya   0.8 %   0.5 % 98.4
Nigeria   3.0 %   1.2 %       Over 100
Others   0.7 %   0.4 %       Over 100
Asia Pacific   8.2 % 13.3 %  36.9
Source: BP, 2008
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